Technology is a crucial site in producing and confronting these crises and imperatives. Technology does not refer so much to individual products and processes, but to sociotechnical systems-a configuration of products, processes, services and infrastructures, regulations, skills, preferences, expectations, and actors (e.g., producers, suppliers, policymakers, users) that fulfill societal needs such as energy, food, or mobility provision. These elements are aligned and fine-tuned to each other, making them a system. 4 We historians of technology should challenge the view that there are no real alternatives to the currently dominant unsustainable energy, mobility, food, water, healthcare, and other sociotechnical systems whose guiding routines are focused on intensive use of fossil fuels and other natural resources, waste production, mass production, mass consumption, mechanization, and labor productivity. This is unsustainable because the costs and benefits are distributed in a highly unequal way, and because their so-called externalities, for example global warming, threaten the future of our planet. For sure, if we continue to cling to an ideology fueled by a belief in the power of the market and innovation to solve all problems, we will not be able to stop climate change and we will make ordinary people pay for the costs. As a society we need alternatives to these sociotechnical systems, which have reached the limits of their capacity to adapt. We need to provide these alternatives, without giving up democratic ideals and giving in to a technocratic super State.
Could it be true that we as historians of technology can have significant impact in the collective search for alternatives? My answer is affirmative. Using the historical imagination, we can help the world to understand the current situation; we can challenge the way various actors think about the past, and the way they think about path-dependencies and alternative scenarios, and by doing so open up a new understanding of the present and the future. We can only do this when we are prepared to engage with the current world and its problems and come out of our comfort zone. I believe we might need to re-invent how we practice history of technology. What is this about? It is about the need for deep collaboration with other disciplines, not only the social sciences and humanities but also the sciences and engineering. It is also about engaging with the stakeholders of our research-business, the policy world, and civil society-not after our research is finished, but early on in an interactive way. Finally it is about addressing head on what C. Wright Mills has called the troubles of our time.
5
The question about the social impact of human action brought me to history of technology. As a history student, I was interested in the big questions. One of them was the perennial question of whether history is made by individual human action or shaped by structural forces. I was looking for a pivotal case study to explore this rather broad question. Reading the work of Jacques Ellul and Lewis Mumford, and becoming inspired by the social constructivist work of Trevor Pinch and Wiebe Bijker, I decided to use history of technology as a case study. 6 It is a case study I never left. Of course, to do in-depth empirical research, I had to find a concrete entry point. I decided to focus on farmers in Zeeland, a province in the Netherlands, who had to respond to what was presented to them as a new industrial technology. Modernizers told them there was no alternative. I zoomed in on the growing and manufacturing of madder, a natural red dye embedded in a root cultivated by farmers. The Dutch had been the industry leaders for several centuries, but during the nineteenth century were confronted with a new type of madder product developed by French competitors, who had industrialized its production. The Dutch farmers responded not by switching to the new industrial production mode, but by upgrading their decentralized way of producing madder. They did not believe that the new industrial option would deliver positive results. On the contrary, they argued that innovating their own craft-based tradition would produce higher-quality madder and a fairer distribution of income, and eventually would make it possible to preserve a strong market position. And it did. 7 This case study became a building block for a larger historical argument about the origins and nature of Dutch industrialization. In the early modern period the Dutch Republic had claimed a leading position based on technological leadership, but lost this position and the United Kingdom became the birthplace of the Industrial Revolution, so the story goes. Based on the madder case, I challenged this view by arguing that the Dutch followed their own industrialization path, which was different, based on a form of merchant capitalism married to smaller-scale production; but it was not backward. On the contrary, it was forward looking, presenting an alternative industrialization model.
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Later on, with colleagues at the University of Twente led by Arie Rip, we developed a new innovation theory which takes up the idea of concurrent development paths, but also provides a way of thinking about dynamics of radical sociotechnical change. This theory is currently known as the multilevel perspective, but initially we advanced it as a quasi-evolutionary theory of technical change.
9 It is a bridge between evolutionary theories of technical change, and insights from constructivist scholars and historians of technology. This work on the multilevel perspective was a major input into the development of a new field called Sustainability Transitions.
10
This is not the place to elaborate on it, but the basic insight of the multilevel perspective is that human action is not driven by rational choice, vested interest, or perception. Human action is driven by routines or rule sets which are embedded in sociotechnical systems and therefore are highly resilient and adaptive. These rules provide a certain worldview which makes people prefer certain technological options above others. Yet while certain technological options, and the social relations which come with them, are dominant, there are always niches where alternative forms of behavior and technology thrive. They might become a threat to the dominant sociotechnical rule sets and systems. On top of that, external shocks and trends, generated by a sociotechnical landscape, are important since they might create challenges which cannot be solved within dominant regimes and thus create windows of opportunity for niches to grow.
Change, or transition of sociotechnical systems, comes about through the interplay of regimes, niches, and landscape factors. It always involves political struggle, crisis, and conflict, and to explain the outcome of these struggles is the core objective of the multilevel perspective. This perspective has not only been instrumental in developing the field of Sustainability Transitions, but also helped define a large-scale, collective research program on Technology and the Making of the Netherlands: The Age of Contested Modernization, better known in the corridors of Dutch universities as 11 The multilevel perspective made it possible to integrate technology into a larger story about Dutch modernization.
In coming years, building on these insights together with colleagues at the Science Policy Research Unit (SPRU) and elsewhere, using the historical imagination, we will be working on what we will call the First and Second Deep Transition. Deep refers to a coordinated change of many sociotechnical systems in a similar direction. The main idea is that this coordination is provided by a meta-routine which shapes the individual routines of each separate sociotechnical system. The concept of Deep Transition is similar to the concept of Great Transformation, but with a focus on the role of innovation in modernization and on sociotechnical system change. For Polanyi transformation had unfolded through a double movement, on the one hand the creation of the market and on the other hand the establishment of a strong state to protect people against the dangers of the free market. This double movement is also visible in the way modern societies manage innovation processes (which is not discussed by Polanyi). Let me explain what I mean by this. Modernization was accompanied by the emergence of a set of institutions which rewarded innovation, and disconnected innovation from its impacts. In a modern (or capitalist) system, promoters of innovation are not responsible for its wider impacts on employment, the quality of a society, and/or the natural environment. In other words, modernization nurtured the development of a specific modernist practice of science and technology politics in which science and technology should be stimulated as much as possible. They are seen as value-free tools to bring progress, material wealth, health, and a better life.
12 Modernization (and capitalism) turned science and technology into the Holy Grail, the lever of riches, to cite Joel Mokyr, the harbinger of progress and the measure of man, to cite Michael Adas.
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In the early modern period this unconstrained freedom for science and technology did not exist. Technological change was embedded in religious and social institutions, in a moral economy, and always from the start assessed against social norms. This assessment took place in guilds, for example, but also through protest, and eventually could lead to machine breaking, a legitimate practice to influence technological choice. This does not mean that guilds or for that matter machine breakers were against innovation. They were against specific innovations which would do harm to their values, the society, and their vision of the future. They wanted to open up spaces for discussing technological choice and redirecting innovation. 14 During the First Great Transformation, or as I prefer to say, the First Deep Transition, the responsibility for the negative impacts of innovation was transferred to the nation-states. They had to provide regulation and arrange the distribution of wealth and income through taxation. However, the combination of promotion of innovation and economic growth and regulation of negative impacts does not seem to be able to address the problems of a world in transition anymore-poverty, inequality, climate change, and many others succinctly captured by United Nations sustainable development goals. This institutional failure is at the heart of the crisis of capitalism. And it is for this reason that science and technology are central to the needed Deep Transition, not because they can fix problems, but because the emergence and institutionalizing of a new way of embedding science and technology in society could help to shape a new form of inclusive development. Inclusive because more actors and factors will be in the assessment and development of one of the central motors of capitalism: innovation.
Since it is still early days for the Second Deep Transition, it is hard to characterize, but let me try to do this by providing two opposing future scenarios: a brutal Deep Transition and a more inclusive one. Brutal transitions will generate economic growth driven by innovation, but outcomes include a very unequal distribution of wealth, unequal access to opportunities, an uneven quality of life, and unequal exposure to pollution and the effects of climate change. These effects were mainly unequally distributed between North and South, but instead will now also produce ruptures within the North. Inequality is on the move, and is becoming transnational. The state is called on to safeguard a fairer distribution, but is not able to deliver since its power is eroded by many developments, including the emergence of megacities and new technocratic supranational structures and interdependencies. In this scenario, capitalism becomes unrestrained again, which has the potential to undermine the social, political, and ecological conditions on which it is built, leading to economic depressions, war, and natural disasters. The costs of this will be highly unevenly distributed, but revolution is contained by technocratic structures and by force. Inclusive transitions will also generate economic growth driven by innovation, but a different type of growth, one which prevents the generation of huge inequalities. In this type of transformation we do not expect the national state to redistribute ex-post some of the benefits of economic growth. Instead, distribution issues are dealt with ex-ante, through a process of inclusive innovation which does not generate such huge distribution issues anymore. The state does not disappear in this scenario, it will only be reconfigured. It will not focus so much on promotion of research and development and regulation of externalities, but on enabling transformative change. The ambition will be to deliver a new type of inclusive modernization, building on the creativity of entrepreneurs and civil society.
I want to emphasize that I am not negative about the accomplishments of modernization and capitalism. Let's not forget they provided growth with benefits for many and led to the welfare state (but only in the West). They also led to democratization of mobility, both socially and geographically, but also politically. They inspired the creation of nation-states, once a liberating project. They produced citizens and led to the inclusion of both men and women in a democratic system. This is historically a very positive result. However, modernization generates many new problems which cannot be solved anymore by more innovation.
My invitation to historians of technology is to engage with the issues referred to by the concept of First and Second Deep Transition not just individually but also collectively. When I make a plea for engagement with the troubles of our time, I am also calling on the Society for the History of Technology as a platform where we meet and discuss our research. I am a firm believer and practitioner of collective research projects in which advanced researchers, as well as early career and Ph.D. students can thrive and also form a community working together on a shared set of issues and concerns. This brings a lot of excitement, pleasures, and excellent scholarship as the participants of the various collective projects I have been involved in-the Greening of Industry Network, two History of Technology in the Netherlands programs, the Knowledge Network for System Innovations and Sustainability Transitions program, the Tensions of Europe network-can testify. As a consequence, over the years I have been able to work with so many inspiring people within all these networks and programs. I owe a lot to all of them. Here I can mention only a few with whom I have traveled a long time and who have supported me over many years.
First, Harry Lintsen, the father of the birth of the Dutch history of technology in the late 1970s and 1980s. He has been my mental coach throughout my career. I met Harry for the first time when I was a passionate history Master's student. I had started my work on the madder industry and was already reading larger implications into my single case study. At that time Harry had begun a larger study of Dutch industrialization from the point of view of history of technology. When I met him I immediately questioned his approach. Harry did not respond in a defensive way, but rather encouraged me to develop my thinking, asked further useful and pertinent questions, and eventually invited me to join his gang: Martijn Bakker, Ernst Homburg, Dick van Lente, Giel van Hooff, and Geert Verbong. Collaboratively, we were writing the history of Dutch industrialization in the nineteenth century, and Harry was our fearless leader. 15 Later on when I was leading similar large-scale collaborative research efforts, his advice helped me through difficult moments and trade-offs involved in such endeavors. He taught me to be reflexive about my own role.
Second, Arie Rip, my Ph.D. supervisor and teacher. I tend to venture into new fields, but Arie was always ahead of me, pointing at interesting ways to go, forcing me to go deeper and not accept easy answers. Arie has shaped my thinking, even to the extent that it was difficult to understand where his thinking ended and my own thinking started. Arie is a very generous intellectual, always willing to share his ideas. I have profited from his deep insights in a myriad of ways. He invented the multilevel perspective which became so crucially important to my research and that of many others. 16 She made me better understand what it is to be a historian of technology. During the early 1990s, we started working together with a larger group of Dutch scholars on a new Dutch twentieth-century history, which resulted in the so-called TIN-20 book series. 18 We have been working together ever since, in particular in founding the Tensions of Europe project and shaping its intellectual agenda, again with a large group of scholars. 19 The Tensions of Europe project led among other things to the Making Europe book series. 20 Both projects were an adventure and it has been a privilege and pleasure to have Ruth with me during both journeys, from start to finish.
Finally I would like to thank the people behind the scenes who made it possible for me and others to do these large-scale collaborative projects.
1) The industrial board members of the Foundation for the History of Technology, a unique organization in our field. They often passionately helped to secure funding for projects and discussed history of technology insights.
2) The board members of the Technical University of Eindhoven who have always supported history of technology research and teaching at their university.
3) The staff members of the Foundation, in particular Jan Korsten, with whom I have worked since 1998 and without whom the I am working with a new group of wonderful colleagues at SPRU on Second Deep Transition issues, and I will seek to employ the historical imagination. Our world in transition is facing grim, difficult, and urgent problems. We are not in the position to stay complacent. A sense of urgency is necessary without, however, nurturing fear since, as Andy Stirling (a SPRU colleague) has argued, this closes down debate and leads to bad solutions. 21 During his entire life, SPRU founder Chris Freeman embraced an Economics of Hope which embodies a positive view of the potential of humankind to use its resources constructively. 22 In this spirit, I would like
